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Abstract 
The most recent episode of market turmoil exposed the limitations resulting from the 
traditional focus on too-big-to-fail institutions within an increasingly systemic-crisis-prone 
financial system, and encouraged the appearance of the too-connected-to-fail (TCTF) 
concept. The TCTF concept conveniently broadens the base of potential destabilizing 
institutions beyond the traditional banking-focused approach to systemic risk, but requires 
methodologies capable of coping with complex, cross-dependent, context-dependent and 
non-linear systems.  
After comprehensively introducing the rise of the TCTF concept, this paper presents a 
robust, parsimonious and powerful approach to identifying and assessing systemic risk 
within payments systems, and proposes some analytical routes for assessing financial 
authorities’ challenges. Banco de la Republica’s approach is based on a convenient 
mixture of network topology basics for identifying central institutions, and payments 
systems simulation techniques for quantifying the potential consequences of central 
institutions failing within Colombian large-value payments systems.  
Unlike econometrics or network topology alone, results consist of a rich set of quantitative 
outcomes that capture the complexity, cross-dependency, context-dependency and non-
linearity of payments systems, but conveniently disaggregated and dollar-denominated. 
These outcomes and the proposed analysis provide practical information for enhanced 
policy and decision-making, where the ability to measure each institution’s contribution to 
systemic risk may assist financial authorities in their task to achieve payments system’s 
stability.  
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topology, simulation, central bank liquidity.  
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BF  Brokerage Firm (please refer to Table 1) 
BR  Banco de la República (Colombia’s central bank) 
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NCI  Non-credit Intermediaries (non-banking institutions, please refer to Table 1) 
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PFM  Pension Fund Manager (please refer to Table 1) 
PoQ  Payments on Queue  
PS Payments  System 
QRA  Queue Resolution Algorithm 
RTGS  Real-Time Gross Settlement system 
SEN  BR’s Electronic Negotiation System (TES only) 
TBTF Too-big-to-fail 
TCTF Too-connected-to-fail 
TES  Colombia’s central government local bond 
TLF  Transitory Liquidity Facility 





The most recent episode of market turmoil exposed the limitations resulting from the 
traditional focus on too-big-to-fail (henceforth referred as TBTF) institutions within an 
increasingly systemic-crisis-prone financial system. It is clear now that financial stability 
may not only be endangered by massive banking institutions, but also by non-banking 
participants significantly and intricately linked within the payments system. This has 
encouraged the appearance of the too-connected-to-fail concept (henceforth referred as 
TCTF), and has fostered an ongoing debate on financial authorities’ (i.e. central banks, 
regulators and supervisors) role facing systemic shocks, either during market’s disruption 
or tranquil periods.  
Acknowledging the TCTF concept broadens the base of potential destabilizing entities 
beyond the traditional banking-focused approach to systemic risk, but requires 
methodologies which cope with complex, cross-dependent, context-dependent and non-
linear systems. A current trend for assessing the complexity and cross-dependency of 
financial and payments systems is based on network topology (hereafter NT), whilst 
context-dependency and non-linearity tends to be overlooked.  
Hence, despite providing a comprehensive picture of systems’ stability and resilience, NT 
is not suitable for approaching some of financial authorities’ key practical concerns: If a 
systemic relevant institution fails, what is the intra-day and end-of-the-day dollar-value of 
the liquidity required by each institution within the system? Is the legal framework for 
customary and last-resort liquidity facilities appropriate for all the system´s participants? Is 
there any single institution or type of institution that conceals systemic risk? What is the 
market’s liquidity level which may intensify dependence between institutions? 
Therefore, based on a convenient mixture of NT (Becher et al., 2008; Soramäki et al., 
2006) and payments systems simulation techniques (Leinonen and Soramäki, 2004), 
Banco de la República (BR) developed a robust, parsimonious and powerful approach for 
identifying and assessing systemic risk within Colombia’s financial markets. First, NT 
basics are used to identify TCTF institutions according to the centrality concept. 
Afterwards, based on the observed transactions of an estimated payments system’s 
typical day, the simulation procedure replicates Colombian large-value payments systems’ 
queue resolution and multilateral settlement algorithms in order to quantify the potential 
consequences of the collapse of a TCTF institution.  
Unlike econometrics, other customary approaches and NT alone, results consist of a 
remarkably rich set of quantitative outcomes which capture the complexity, cross-
dependency, context-dependency and non-linearity of the payments system, but 
conveniently disaggregated and dollar-denominated. These outcomes and the proposed 
analysis provide financial authorities with practical information for enhanced policy and 
decision-making, where the ability to estimate each institution’s contribution to systemic 
risk may assist financial authorities in their task to achieve payments system’s stability.  
This paper is divided in four sections. The first –next- section briefly covers the 
development of the TBTF concept for detecting and assessing systemic risk, ending with 
the recent appeal for the TCTF concept. The second analyzes the rationale behind the 
surge of connectedness as an alternative concept for detecting and assessing systemic 
risk. The third section is dedicated to familiarize the reader with some key features of 
Colombia’s payments system; to present the chosen approach, and to analyze the results. 4 
 
Finally, the fourth section makes some concluding remarks that may be useful for financial 
authorities.  
1 The  too-big-to-fail concept for systemic risk 
Traditional assessment of systemic risk has focused on those market participants 
considered as TBTF, where that label may be granted to an institution when, due to its 
size, its inability to meet its obligations could result in the inability of other system 
participants or of financial institutions in other parts of the financial system to meet their 
obligations as they become due. Basically TBTF institutions are those exceeding an 
asset-size cutoff (Saunders et al., 2009), which is a convenient and straightforward metric 
readily available for any regulator or central bank, even accessible for any market 
participant or a fairly informed ordinary man.  
Despite more complicated definitions may focus on the volume of financial services (e.g. 
deposits, loans) provided by an institution within the financial system (IMF et al., 2009) or 
other less forthright metrics, the TBTF concept for identifying systemically important 
institutions is rather uncomplicated, and may explain why customary tools for crisis 
prevention and management are designed specifically for large bank runs (e.g. lender of 
last resort –LLR-, deposit insurance). Moreover, because it focuses on standard 
accounting data (e.g. assets, investments, deposits), financial authorities have found this 
approach as practical. This type of supervision may be depicted as micro-prudential, 
since, as defined by Brunnermeier et al. (2009), it focuses on factors that affect the 
stability of individual institutions.  
Financial history documents supervisors and central banks’ reliance on the TBTF-based 
approach for detecting and assessing systemic risk. Quantitative evidence validates that 
the larger the institution, the closer the scrutiny by regulators and the less likely they are 
left to collapse
7 (Heffernan, 2005; Gup, 1998). In fact, as will be presented next, some of 
the most relevant episodes of systemic instability throughout history include the failure or 
near failure of a large banking or non-banking institution.   
Regarding early episodes of large banking failures, it is worthwhile describing U.K. and 
U.S. cases in the late 19
th and the wake of the 20
th centuries, respectively. In 1866 
England experienced the collapse of Overend Gurney and Co. Ltd., a financial institution 
involved in banking and bill broking, with a balance sheet ten times the size of the second 
largest, which precipitated the failure of a considerable number of other banking and non-
banking institutions. Despite Bank of England refused to rescue Overend, which was 
finally declared insolvent due to losses resulting from bills of dubious quality and lending 
with poor collateral, Bank of England’s actions during the episode
8 stated that it would 
intervene as LLR in situations of severe panic related to large banking institutions 
(Heffernan, 2005). In 1890 Baring Brothers, a large international merchant bank founded 
in 1762, also failed due to non-performing loans granted to Latin American countries, but 
                                                            
7 Based on Gup (1998), who provides a summary of bank failures and near failures comprising 70 institutions 
from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K. and U.S., 
from 1974 to 1997, authors calculated that regarding episodes involving large banking institutions (24), 22 
ended without liquidation or closure (91.7%); episodes involving medium banking institutions (8) always ended 
without liquidation or closure (100%); and episodes involving small institutions (38), 15 ended without 
liquidation or closure (39.5%).     
8 In order to face the episode the Bank of England was allowed to suspend the 1844’s Bank Act (also known 
as Peel’s Act). Under this act Bank of England’s discretionary ability to issue notes was restricted to a 
statutory £14 million above its holdings of gold bullion (Chancellor, 2000). 5 
 
was finally rescued with private funds from the Baring family. Both cases, Baring Brothers 
and Overend, were the result of assets’ mismanagement.   
In the United States, resulting from the stock market crash of October 1929, 608 banks 
(with $550 million of deposits) failed during November-December 1930.  As in the case of 
Overend Gurney and Co. Ltd. in the U.K., a large banking institution, The Bank of United 
States, failed. According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963), because it was the largest 
commercial bank by volume of deposits ever to have failed up to that time in the U.S. and 
due to its name, the systemic consequences of the failure of The Bank of United States in 
December 11
th 1930 were substantial. Some other large failures followed. Ultimately, the 
banking crises transformed a recession into the Great Depression (Krugman, 2009).     
After these large bank-related failures institutions’ size gradually emerged as a critical 
concept for supervision and regulation purposes. This was the result of a dramatic change 
in the character of the contractions in late 1930, when several large bank failures led to 
the first of what were to prove a series of liquidity crises involving runs on banks and bank 
failures on a scale unprecedented in U.S. history (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963).  
The first case of U.S. regulators using a TBTF policy to identify, assess and contain 
systemic risk originating in a large financial institution came in the 1980s with the 
Continental Illinois bank
9 (Heffernan, 2005). Continental Illinois was the seventh largest 
and the largest correspondent bank in the U.S. at that time, with assets about $41.4 
billion. Regulators claimed that 66 banks, with assets about $5 billion, had investments in 
Continental Illinois that accounted for 100% of their equity capital, whereas other 113 
banks, with assets of more than $12 billion, had investments that accounted within the 
50%-100% range of their equity capital. After the Comptroller of the Currency announced 
in congressional testimony that the government would not let any of the eleven largest 
banks fail (Gup, 1998), Continental Illinois was rescued in 1984, nationalized in 1989, and 
taken over by Bank of America Corp. in 1994. It is worth mentioning that Continental 
Illinois’ near failure resulted from its reliance on overseas funding and on oil and gas 
collateralized loans –both  experiencing a severe downturn by mid 1980s-, and from its 
direct exposure ($1 billion) to large participations in high-risk oil loans from Penn Square 
Bank, a bank that was allowed to fail in 1982 because it wasn’t considered a major bank.    
In the U.K. one of the most famous cases of a size-related policy for assessing and 
containing systemic risk belongs to the Bank of England’s rescue of Johnson Matthey 
Bankers in 1984 after it had to write-off half of its loan portfolio. Johnson Matthey Bankers 
was a banking institution pertaining to one of the five London gold price fixers (Johnson 
Matthey), which was one of the largest non-banking institutions in the City. According to 
Heffernan (2005), this is a rare case in which the TBTF doctrine was extended to protect 
large non-banking arms of a financial institution. As with Baring Brothers, Overend, Penn 
Square Bank and Continental Illinois, Johnson Matthey Bankers case is due to 
mismanagement of assets (e.g. non-performing loans). 
The first legendary application of the TBTF concept for non-banking institutions was the 
effort by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) to organize a consortium of 
investment banks in order to avoid the failure of a massive hedge-fund in 1998: Long 
Term Capital Management (LTCM). LTCM is a well-known case because it is a rather 
                                                            
9 According to Kaufman (2002), other U.S. banks that were extended assistance via de LLR facilities under 
the TBTF criteria were the Franklin National Bank [1974], the First Republic Bank  [1987], MCorp [1988] and 
the Bank of New England [1990]. Nevertheless, Kaufman agrees with Heffernan (2005) when concluding that 
the only genuine TBTF case was the Continental Illinois episode.  6 
 
clear example of a large non-banking institution compromising financial stability (i.e. 
assets and liabilities amounted to $129 billion and $124.5 billion just before its collapse, 
respectively, and loans and derivatives positions estimated at $1.4 trillion), and because 
the intervention took place despite hedge funds were not regulated by the FRBNY, and 
albeit fund’s portfolio wasn’t even located in the U.S., but in Cayman Islands. As put 
forward by Lhabitant (2006), controversy followed LTCM’s rescue because, for the first 
time, despite being a privately owned fund, with no widows or orphans to protect
10, a 
hedge fund was deemed TBTF, a status hitherto reserved for countries and large banks. 
Moreover, as stated by Freixas et al. (2002), additional relevance from LTCM comes in 
the form of private sector’s embracing the TBTF concept for rescuing the hedge fund.  
Despite public funds were not used to bail-out LTCM, FRBNY’s struggle to coordinate the 
$3.6 billion rescue of a 124.5 billion-assets hedge fund drew attention to other large non-
banking institutions. Two of these large non-banking institutions that immediately 
concentrated attention were The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac), and The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). As early as in 2003, 
taking into account that the combined balance sheet of these two institutions was about 
$1.5 trillion, Heffernan (2005) stressed the systemic risk posed by them under the TBTF 
concept, and emphasized on the incapability of the private sector for implementing a 
rescue analogous to the one orchestrated by the FRBNY for LTCM.  
Recent developments confirmed that worries about the systemic importance of large non-
banking institutions such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were not unfounded. The first 
global financial crisis of the twenty-first century began –silently- in 2006, but became 
noticeable by the late spring of 2006 when housing prices began to decline (Krugman, 
2009). As a consequence of a weak housing market the earliest negative announcements 
began to appear during 2007
11, and got worse during 2008
12. Without any doubt, the 
involvement of large financial institutions characterized the severity and extent of the 
crisis.    
Nevertheless, troubled large institutions (e.g. AIG, Bear Sterns, Lehman, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac) appeared rather late in the crisis, and their entrance resulted from their 
direct or indirect exposure to the U.S. subprime-mortgage market. Moreover, the 2005-
2006 U.S. housing slump was not novel in recent history, with a few sharp declines in U.S. 
housing prices (e.g. 1989-1993 home prices fell by over 13%), and even in other major 
financial markets (e.g. Japan during the 1990s); as acknowledged by Pozen (2010), prior 
to 2008, no housing slump in any country has ever led to a global financial crisis. As 
suggested by Bullard et al. (2009), a relatively small portion of the home mortgage market 
triggered the most severe financial crisis in the United States since the Great Depression, 
whilst Haldane (2009) judges the subprime crisis as a rather modest shock by global 
financial standards.   
                                                            
10 In fact the entry terms were rather tough: $10 million minimum investment, three-year lock-up, 2% 
management fee and 25% performance fee (Lhabitant, 2006).  
11 HSBC Holdings announced higher delinquencies than expected –priced- in a subprime portfolio [March 5
th]; 
New Century Financial, the second-largest subprime lender, declared bankruptcy [April 22
nd]; BNP Paribas 
suspended calculations of three money market funds exposed to subprime debt and halted redemptions 
[August 9
th]; Bank of England announced liquidity support and a government guarantee for Northern Rock’s 
existing deposits [September 14
th and 17
th]; Freddie Mac announced 2007 Q3 losses [November 20
th]; Bear 
Stearns announced expected 2007 Q4 write-downs [December 20
th] (Acharya et al. 2009). 
12 Not only major financial institutions announced losses (Lehman Brothers, Bear Sterns, Citibank, Merrill 
Lynch), but also recognized valuation models’ weaknesses (AIG [February 11
th]); purchases and 
nationalizations were made public (Northern Rock by the U.K. government, Bear Sterns by JP Morgan [March 
16
th], Merrill Lynch by Bank of America [September 15
th]); closures were decided (Indymac [July 11
th]); 
rescues were announced (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, by the U.S. Treasury [July 13
th], AIG by the U.S. 
government [September 16
th]); and, finally, bankruptcy materialized (Lehman Brothers [September 15
th]). 7 
 
After the crisis literature has converged to declare the obsolescence of the current model 
of supervision and systemic risk assessment. Banks, which have been considered as the 
main focus of systemic risk detection and assessment because of their size (e.g. assets, 
deposits, loans), were not the main source of systemic risk as before (i.e. via non-
performing loans, mismanagement of assets, balance mismatch). The financial system 
has changed dramatically since the Great Depression: though banks still play a large role, 
many functions that defined their traditional domain are increasingly performed by 
securities markets and non-bank market participants (Kambhu et al., 2007), namely 
unleveraged institutional investors (e.g. mutual and pension funds) and highly leveraged 
institutions (e.g. hedge funds); this is, non-banking participants make up the so-called 
“parallel banking system” or  “shadow banking system” mentioned by Krugman (2009) and 
Acharya et al. (2009). 
But the most recent global financial crisis is not the only example of the importance of the 
“shadow banking system”. Besides its extraordinary size, LTCM episode exhibited other 
particularities that financial markets, central banks and supervisors were not familiar with 
at that time. Concerning LTCM, Brown et al. (2009) asserts that the hedge funds industry  
poses systemic risk because (i) hedge funds are able to be highly leveraged, which allows 
them for obtaining high returns, but also may end in low or negative capital when facing 
severe declines in their investment portfolios; (ii) they tend to follow similar investment 
strategies; and (iii) there is a lack of transparency in their exposures and the counterparty 
risk they generate.  
About leverage, Chancellor (2000) documents that the effective leverage within LTCM 
was reported to exceed $100 of debt for every dollar of equity, which served to build a 
loans and derivatives position estimated at $1.4 trillion. This leverage may also explain 
why during May and June 1998 LTCM experienced a 16% decrease in its market value 
due to a widening of spreads in the mortgage-backed securities market, followed by an 
additional 52% decrease in August after the Russian crises exploded, which ended in its 
September 23
rd bailout after experiencing losses about 83% in that month only (Brown et 
al., 2009).  
Concerning the use of similar strategies within the hedge funds industry, supervisors were 
suspicious that if LTCM was allowed to fail, it wouldn’t be the only hedge fund to do so. 
Despite there are several sorts of hedge funds, they all share a common feature: they 
provide liquidity to the aggregate of those who demand liquidity. Therefore, as Brown et 
al. (2009) warns, it is quite natural that hedge funds follow similar strategies because they 
all take the other side of the liquidity demand and so end up with returns and positions 
that are correlated. Such correlation may result in additional systemic risk because 
problems in a single non-small or several non-large hedge funds may seriously erode the 
market value of the whole industry’s portfolios via declining market liquidity and “liquidity 
spirals
13”. Furthermore, because hedge funds’ strategies had been highly profitable since 
their inception, other industries were mimicking them, extending correlation and systemic 
risk to other parts of the financial markets; that was the case of Salomon Brothers’ $1 
billion losses in analogous arbitrage positions during 1998’s third quarter. 
Vis-à-vis the lack of transparency in their exposures and the counterparty risk they 
generate, LTCM was not only large by on and off-balance positions, but it was an 
                                                            
13 “Liquidity spirals” refers to the internal amplifying process whereby a falling asset leads to more sales 
(deleveraging), which further drives down asset prices, financial intermediaries’ profit and loss statements, and 
balance sheets net worth (Brunnermeier et al. 2009). In the case of hedge funds, “liquidity spirals” may be 
particularly harsh due to the leverage they are allowed to work with, which forces hedge funds to unwind large 
positions when facing losses or margin calls.  8 
 
important –and obscure- source of counterparty risk for global markets. As documented 
by Brown et al. (2009), LTCM’s off-balance positions comprised $1.3 trillion notional 
values of derivative positions, where six banks worldwide acted as counterparties of $1 
trillion approximately. According to Lhabitant (2006), LTCM’s own estimate was that its 17 
largest counterparties, in closing out their positions with LTCM, would have incurred in 
aggregated losses between $3 billion and $5 billion, with some individual institutions 
losing as much as $500 million. Despite this direct losses figures were non-trivial, the 
FRBNY’s eagerness for orchestrating the rescue resulted from the potential indirect 
consequences of LTCM failing. As put forward by Greenspan (1998) when defending the 
Federal Reserve’s role before the U.S. House of Representatives, “the act of unwinding 
LTCM's portfolio in a forced liquidation would not only have a significant distorting impact 
on market prices but also in the process could produce large losses, or worse, for a 
number of creditors and counterparties, and for other market participants who were not 
directly involved with LTCM.”   
Nevertheless, LTCM and the most recent global financial crisis are not the only cases 
where institutions’ size is not enough to explain the episode in full. On June 26
th 1974 the 
failure of a small German bank, Bankhaus Herstatt, almost resulted in the U.S. clearing 
system’s collapse. Despite its size (around 50.000 customers and DM 2.0 billion in 
assets), its closure by the German supervisory institution and Bundesbank’s cease to 
clear for its account, caused an overseas chain reaction that began when Chase 
Manhattan, its correspondent bank in the U.S., decided not to honor $620 millions in 
payment orders and checks drawn on behalf of Herstatt’s account. As documented by 
Davis (1995), the immediate consequences were that the U.S. clearing system nearly 
collapsed, the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) computer was 
switched off and the banks had to barter checks. This episode, where a small and 
“outside” institution almost resulted in the collapse of the U.S. payments system, 
encouraged the formation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Manning et al. 
2009;  Alexander et al., 2006).  
Consequently, evidence demonstrates that focusing exclusively on the institutions’ size 
averts authorities from effectively detecting and assessing the systemic risk lurking 
beneath the nowadays highly complex and interconnected global financial system; this is, 
regulation and supervision were too institution-centric to see through to the systemic risk 
(IMF, 2009). Hence, several authors (Chan-Lau, 2010; Clark, 2010; Acharya et al., 2009; 
Saunders et al., 2009; Zhou, 2009; Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Trichet, 2009) recognize 
the inevitability of using a broader set of concepts in order to detect and assess systemic 
risk.  
2  An increasingly systemic-crisis-prone financial system 
The simplest definition –from the Merriam-Webster dictionary- of a system could be: “a 
regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole”. Three 
main concepts comprise this definition: (i) items, (ii) interactions (interdependence) and 
(iii) the whole, which could be conveniently exchanged for the purpose of this paper with 
(i) institutions, (ii) payments
14 and (iii) the financial market. Despite being obvious that 
none of these concepts exists in isolation, supervision has mainly focused on the 
institutions only, where the best example is the reliance on the institutions’ size and other 
accounting metrics or ratios for detecting and assessing the risk within the whole system.   
                                                            
14 Some authors (Chan-Lau, 2010b) regard balance sheet claims as connections. As will be addressed in the 
next chapter, this document embraces payments as the primary source of connectivity.  9 
 
Financial markets constitute one among many other systems exhibiting a complex 
organization and dynamics, where the large number of mutually interacting parts self-
organize their internal structure and dynamics with novel and sometimes surprising 
macroscopic emergent properties (Sornette, 2003); that is, the financial system is a 
complex adaptive system (Haldane, 2009). Thus, the micro-prudential approach to 
financial markets’ systemic risk, which focuses on closely analyzing the system’s 
components (institutions), is not only insufficient, but highly unsafe; as demonstrated by 
recent periods of financial turmoil (i.e. LTCM, the subprime crisis), the connections 
between components are as important as the components themselves.  
Recognizing the importance of the interdependence between participants may 
significantly complicate the analysis. The smaller the number of items and connections, 
the easier it is to understand and analyze the system. The financial system exhibits a 
myriad of participants, which maintain numerous connections (i.e. they engage in 
payments) with several other participants, whereas the characteristics of the institutions  
and their payments are dynamic, with episodes of extreme shifts in their individual and 
collective behavior. Therefore, as suggested by Landau (2009), the structure of financial 
systems, which is based on the interdependence between multiple actors and 
counterparties, is complex.  
Nevertheless, despite this type of complexity makes difficult to observe, understand and 
analyze the financial system, it is not an undesirable feature at all. Complex systems, 
characterized by numerous participants and connections, may take advantage of the 
existence of internal self-regulatory and self-repairing processes which could make the 
system robust to random shocks.
15 That is, the existence of numerous participants allows 
for significantly different holdings and strategies across the financial system, where such 
heterogeneity permits a proper and efficient risk dispersion through the system.  
Unfortunately, this type of advantageous complexity has been gradually fading due to a 
rather undesirable feature of today’s financial markets: homogeneity. A complex system’s 
robustness depends on the diversity of its participants: if all participants develop the same 
task, with the same tools and strategies, and with identical objectives, connectivity may 
not serve the purpose of risk dispersion, but amplification. Based on Haldane (2009) and 
Rebonato (2007), authors conclude that contemporary financial systems have 
experienced a sharp decrease in diversity resulting from three main reasons: (i) pursuit of 
returns; (ii) deregulation and disintermediation; and (iii) uniform risk assessment tools.  
As documented when analyzing LTCM’s case, not only hedge funds followed similar 
strategies within the industry, but other financial institutions, eager to achieve the 
extraordinary returns exhibited by hedge funds during the first half of the 1990s, imitated 
their strategies; that was the case of the investment bank Goldman Sachs. More recently, 
the decline in interest rates on U.S. Treasury bonds during the first half of the 2000s 
stimulated an unanimous appetite for alternative debt securities, where the exposure to 
high-yield subprime mortgages was extensive to all sorts of financial institutions
16. Such 
lack of diversity explains why rolling averages of correlations across financial markets’ 
sectors averaged in excess of 0.9 throughout 2004-2007 (Haldane, 2009) and why 
                                                            
15  Elton’s (1958) seminal work on invasions by animals and plants concluded that complex food webs –with 
numerous species- are likely to contain predators or parasites that control invaders, whereas simpler webs are 
more vulnerable to population explosions; that is, in complex systems there are always enough enemies and 
parasites available to turn on any species that starts being unusually numerous. 
16 Historically low interest rates set by the Fed on short-term Treasuries encouraged the growth of subprime 
mortgages: volume of subprime mortgages rose from $120 billion in 2001 to $600 billion in 2006; this is, from 
under 6% to 20% of all mortgages originated (Pozen, 2010). 10 
 
unprecedented simultaneous write-downs were common among major investment banks 
during the subprime crisis
17. Even central banks –particularly risk adverse agents- are 
reported to have increased their weight on return since the late 1990s, where their 
preference for asset-backed securities, especially mortgage-backed securities, has also 
augmented, along with the increasing use of derivatives (Borio et al., 2008).   
In addition to the pursuit of returns, but inexorably related to it, is the second reason for 
decreasing diversity within financial markets: deregulation and disintermediation. The 
banking industry during the 1980s and 1990s exhibited a dynamic resulting from a 
broader range of activities banks were allowed to engage in, and an unprecedented level 
of liquidity that facilitated capital markets taking on bank’s intermediation activity.  
According to Rebonato (2007) disintermediation pushed banks to undertake trading 
activities in order to compete with non-banking institutions and, because of deregulation,  
they were allowed to do so for the first time since the Great Depression; these new 
activities took the form of bond, equity, currency, commodities, derivatives and securitized 
mortgages’ trading. By the mid 1990s all these activities, specially high-yield complex 
financial instruments, had become an increasingly important source of revenue for all 
financial markets’ participants, making institutions’ strategies and holdings similar to each 
other.  
This deregulation and disintermediation process resulted also in a key characteristic of 
recent episodes of systemic risk: the system has changed from bank-based to market-
based systemic events, where the emphasis shifts from funding liquidity to market liquidity 
(Kambhu et al., 2007; Hendricks et al., 2006; Kohn, 2006), with actual tools for crisis 
management designed specifically for –not very likely
18- large bank runs (e.g. LLR, 
deposit insurance), but insufficient to cope with new –non-banking- sources of systemic 
risk. This unforeseen shift from funding to market liquidity results in insufficient liquidity 
facilities.  
Furthermore, as a consequence of the increasing importance of market-based systemic 
events, current liquidity risk management practices should be examined. Despite liquidity 
risk management is carried out by financial institutions, it is not designed for assessing 
and mitigating persistent (i.e. long-lasting) or systemic (i.e. non-idiosyncratic) liquidity 
shocks (IMF, 2009b). Therefore, financial institutions and the regulators should be aware 
of the existence of a defective liquidity risk management framework, and should work on 
its enhancement.                  
Regarding the existence of uniform risk assessment tools, the widespread use of rather 
similar methods for risk measurement poses an additional threat to financial system’s 
diversity. As acknowledged by the IMF (2007), from a systemic perspective, it is important 
to ensure that there are market participants either sufficiently disparate in their holdings 
and strategies, or able to take large opposing positions during periods of turmoil. In this 
sense, the extensive use of identical risk assessment tools, such as Value at Risk (VaR) 
or other enhanced versions of it (e.g. Conditional VaR), promotes similar risk strategies, 
which result in similar “diversified” portfolios and similar “rational” decisions across 
different banking and non-banking institutions. Even if VaR were a perfect risk 
                                                            
17 Brown et al. (2009) reports that exposures on subprime-backed assets resulted in Morgan Stanley, UBS 
and Merrill Lynch, losing $15, $20 and $30 billion, respectively. 
18 Kambhu et al. (2007) stress that the financial system today does not seem highly prone to contagious runs 
on very large banking firms.  11 
 
assessment tool
19, its universal usage in the financial industry results in an undesirable 
self-defeating mechanism during periods of market chaos, where decreasing prices and 
increasing volatilities are amplified by a destabilizing positive feedback effect; this is akin 
to the case against “portfolio insurance” strategies, which Sornette (2003) regards as a 
major factor contributing to the crash of October 1987.  
IMF (2007) also documents that diversity of risk management models can be a stabilizing 
influence. In addition to this, it is important to mention that this issue is not exclusive to 
risk management tools: the use of similar asset allocation techniques may also engender 
positive feedbacks, either during tranquil or stressful periods; accordingly, from a systemic 
perspective, diversity of asset allocation models may also be desirable.  
Therefore, as Haldane (2009) asserts, the financial system is complex and homogeneous, 
with the former resulting from the participation of numerous institutions, and the latter from 
the lack of diversity when comparing institutions’ strategies and exposures, where the sum 
of both features results in a robust-yet-fragile system. The financial system is robust 
because, on average, the financial system is able to absorb a random shock on behalf of 
the existence of numerous institutions and connections between them; but it is –at the 
same time- fragile, since a targeted shock (an attack) to a hub (a TCTF institution) may 
not be absorbed, but amplified.
20  
In addition to the fragility resulting from complexity and homogeneity, financial innovation 
has made institutions and their interrelatedness even more obscure. Complexity not only 
emerges from the structure or interrelations between participants. Financial innovation, 
regarded as a source of risk diversification and efficiency during tranquil times (e.g. 
structured products, credit derivatives, options), may increase the system’s dimensionality 
and complexity during markets’ unrest.
21  
Haldane (2009) highlights that financial innovations such as securitization (e.g. CDS or 
other structured products) resulted in participants growing in size and interconnections 
multiplying, where the precise source and location of underlying claims became opaque, 
transforming risk into uncertainty in the Knightian sense.
22 Lehman fall provides good 
evidence on the subject: Braithwaite (2011) documents that not only competitors were not 
able to know who was exposed to Lehman, but they were unable to map their own 
exposures with ease, particularly because Lehman was not a single institution –but about 
                                                            
19 Most of VaR shortcomings for effectively assessing risk are widely know (e.g. non-normality, kurtosis, 
skewness) and have been partially addressed using different VaR techniques (e.g. Extreme Value Theory, 
jump-diffusion models, GARCH, historical simulation). Nevertheless, severe shortcomings are still poorly 
addressed, such as long-term scaling, measuring dependence –and diversification effects- during extreme 
events, capturing persistence (cumulative losses) in price changes, among others.  
20 As Haldane (2009) argues, such robust-yet-fragile feature is a result of the system’s complexity and 
homogeneity, but also a consequence of the fat-tailed distribution of institution’s connectivity. About the latter, 
on average, a shock will be aimed to a non-TCTF institution, making the system robust to random shocks; 
however, if the shock is non-random but consists of a shock targeted to the tail of the distribution that contains 
TCTF institutions, the system will be seriously affected. This issue will be addressed in the next chapter.     
21 For example, months before the crisis the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report focused on how credit 
derivatives helped to make the banking and overall financial system more resilient, and to mitigate and absorb 
shocks to the financial system (IMF, 2006); four years –and a global crisis- later, the same report focused on 
how credit derivatives took center stage as difficulties in financial markets intensified and on how they played 
a key role in counterparty risk (IMF, 2010). 
22 According to Knight (1921), who provided an early definition of uncertainty and risk, the former corresponds 
to those cases in which we are unable to quantify the probabilities of various outcomes, whereas risk applies 
to situations where those probabilities can be known. Financial innovation, specially credit derivatives and 
securitization, obscured the way market participants relate to each other, resulting in counterparty risk 
becoming almost unknowable, thus uncertain.    12 
 
10.000 institutions-, so no one could be sure what Lehman was.
 23 In this sense, 
opaqueness in the linkages between participants make the financial system robust-yet-
fragile-and-uncertain.      
Moreover, this uncertainty, where the true counterparty exposure is difficult to define and 
assess, distorts asset pricing and encourages rational but –extremely- hazardous 
behaviors from market participants, such as herding. As a direct consequence of the 
opaqueness resulting from financial innovation, and due to the fact that its optimal to 
imitate when lacking information (Sornette, 2003), it is likely that during periods of turmoil 
market participants will have the “rational” incentive to imitate others’ behavior, reinforcing 
the destabilizing positive feedback effect previously mentioned; this is, making the 
financial system even more fragile. 
 
Finally, it is possible to conveniently characterize financial system’s issues and challenges 
as follows: the sum of complexity, homogeneity and opaqueness results in a robust-yet-
fragile-and-uncertain system, where the existence of a defective risk management 
framework and the absence of liquidity facilities able to cope with the shift towards market 
liquidity risk make the financial system highly prone to systemic crisis. This is summarized 
in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 
An increasingly systemic-crisis-prone financial system: issues and challenges 
 
 
Source: authors´ design. 
                                                            
23 Bear Sterns is also a good example. According to Acharya et al. (2009), while the market was learning 
about who was exposed to Bear Sterns by mid-June 2007, it was still unclear what the magnitude of this 
exposure was and who was at risk through counterparty failure. Kohn (2006) documents that uncertainty 
about counterparty risk –and market prices- was also experienced during 1987 stock market crash and the 

















Models oriented to detecting and assessing systemic risk within the financial system’s 
complexity and homogeneity framework previously described are rather new. Current 
regulation is focused not on systemic risk, but rather on the individual institution’s risk (i.e. 
micro-prudential), whereas regulation encourages financial institutions to distribute their 
risks in an unfettered manner around the system and to unregulated entities, which leads 
to excessive systemic risk (Acharya et al., 2009).    
3  A macro-prudential approach is required: the too-connected-to-fail 
concept 
The most recent global financial crisis, along with LTCM episode and October 1987 stock 
market crash, helped achieving some degree of consensus regarding the call for models 
or techniques able to properly and efficiently detecting and assessing systemic risk. In this 
sense, taking into account that financial markets are a complex system, where   
connections matter as much as the participants that originate them, TCTF concept has 
emerged along with the traditional TBTF concept. Some authors agreeing with this 
statement are Chan-Lau (2010), ECB (2010), Clark (2010) and Zhou (2009).     
Akin to the TBTF concept, TCTF could be straightforwardly defined. Based on a 
customary definition of systemic risk (CPSS, 2001), an institution may be labeled as TCTF 
when, due to its degree of connectedness –either  direct or indirect-, its inability to meet its 
obligations could result in the inability of other system participants or of financial 
institutions in other parts of the financial system (i.e. the whole financial infrastructure) to 
meet their obligations as they become due.  
Nevertheless, identifying a TCTF institution is not as straightforward as with a TBTF, 
where the latter relies on observable concepts and metrics such as the assets’ value or 
the volume of financial services (e.g. deposits and loans) provided by a single institution 
(Figure 2).  
Figure 2 
TBTF and TCTF: a comparison 
 








• Based on observable accounting data. 
• Easy to track.
• “Easy”to forecast.
• Institution centric.
• Focus on banking institutions.
• Unreliable accounting data.
• Unable to capture connectedness 
• Model risk.
• Captures complexity of financial systems.
• Identifies concealed sources of systemic       
risk.
• Recognizes the increasing role of non-banking 
institutions (“shadow banking system”)
• Requires models able to capture cross-
dependency, context-dependency, non-linearity, 
complexity.   
• Define connection: claims? payments? 
• Model risk.
•OverendGurney and Co. Ltd. (U.K., 1866)
•Baring Brothers (U.K., 1890) 
•The Bank of United States (U.S., 1929)
•Johnson Matthey Bankers (U.K., 1984)
•Continental Illinois (U.S., 1984)
• HerstattBankhaus(GER, 1974) 
• LTCM (U.S., 1987)
•AIG, Bear Sterns, Lehman, Freddie Mac,   
Fannie Mae (U.S., 2008)
Financial institutions. Payment systems and instruments (infrastructure) Focus
Individually analyzing and inspecting financial 
institutions Ædefault risk
Aggregately analyzing and inspecting the financial 
system Æsystemic risk Scope14 
 
Identifying a TCTF institution is intricate. Among the main sources of intricacy it is 
worthwhile stressing that measuring an institution’s connectedness is (i) complex and 
cross-dependent by nature (i.e. it cannot be measured in isolation) and (ii) extremely 
context-dependent and non-linear (Landau, 2009; Haldane, 2009).  
Regarding the first source of intricacy for identifying a TCTF institution (i.e. complexity and 
cross-dependency), standard econometric approaches are not suitable for the task 
because the properties and behavior of the institution cannot be analyzed on the basis of 
its own properties and behavior alone, as these may be affected by institutions that have 
links to it, and also by other institutions that have no direct links, but are linked to its 
neighbors (ECB, 2010). A key concept when defining whether an institution fits the TCTF 
concept or not is centrality, which refers to the importance of the participant for the system 
as a whole.    
About context-dependency, because of the numerous participants and connections within 
the financial market, a minor change in the initial conditions of the system (e.g. liquidity, 
regulation, macroeconomic environment) may critically affect the result of the analysis. 
This is, the TCTF label is particularly dynamic, where an institution may become TCTF (or 
non-TCTF) with an otherwise trivial alteration of the status-quo. Despite this may appear 
to be odd, Greenspan (1998) acknowledged that “the plight of LTCM might scarcely have 
caused a ripple in financial markets or among federal regulators 18 months ago – but in 
current circumstances it was judged to warrant attention”.
24 Sensitivity to initial conditions 
is intuitive in the financial markets’ case since, for example, abundant liquidity allows 
institutions to process payments independently from each other, whilst reduced liquidity 
makes institutions’ ability to make payments become coupled with the ability of other 
institutions to make payments (Kambhu et al., 2007).  
Similarly, as with context-dependence, the non-linearity features of complex systems set 
additional hurdles for identifying TCTF institutions. Non-linearity refers to the 
disproportionate effect of a shock in the overall properties of the system, which are not 
easily captured by standard econometric tools. For the subject under study, for example, 
there is some degree of consensus about the lack of correspondence between the 
subprime crisis (i.e. the shock) and the global financial crisis (i.e. the outcome), where the 
former is rather modest when compared to the extent of the whole episode (Bullard et al., 
2009; Haldane, 2009).   
Regarding these two sources of intricacy, Natural and Social Sciences have faced similar 
challenges. For the first one (i.e. complexity and cross-dependency), network topology 
(also referred as network analysis or theory, NT) has been a widely accepted and highly 
convenient approach, since it allows for analyzing systemic risk by looking at how resilient 
the system is to contagion and what the major triggers and channels of contagions are 
(Tumpel-Gugerell, 2009), taking into account the size of flows, interdependencies with 
other systems/markets, and the degree of substitutability (Manning et al., 2009).  
For the second source of intricacy (context-dependence and non-linearity), simulation 
models are useful tools because they can be calibrated to replicate a specific environment 
(Arjani et al., 2007), and because it allows for assessing the impact of altered liquidity 
levels and payment flows in terms of payment queues, liquidity requirements (e.g. 
overnight lending) and the value and number of unsettled transactions (Leinonen and 
Soramäki, 2005).  
                                                            
24 Regarding context-dependency, Pozen (2010) also documents that the bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham 
Lambert in 1990 –the most powerful bond house in the world at the time- had rather limited systemic effects. 15 
 
At the end, because the system is robust-yet-fragile-and-uncertain due to its complexity,  
homogeneity and opaqueness, where the existence of context-dependency and non-
linearity further hinders the use of typical approaches to systemic risk, the use of a 
combination of network theory and simulation techniques may be a comprehensive and 
convenient framework for identifying and assessing systemic risk.  
4  Colombia’s payments system’s stability under the too-connected-
to-fail concept 
A payments system (PS) is a set of instruments, procedures and norms for the transfer of 
funds among participants in the system (CPSS, 2001).  Accordingly, the effectiveness and 
stability of financial markets depends on it functioning properly. Considering how 
important settlement and large-value payment systems are to financial stability, the central 
banks in most countries now own and operate these systemically important systems, 
which use real-time gross settlement (RTGS) as the primary method of settlement.
25  
The systemic importance of a PS depends on the functions it fulfills within the economy.  
According to CPSS (2001), a systemically important PS has at least one of the following 
characteristics: (i) it is the only PS in the country or the main PS in terms of the aggregate 
value of the payments; (ii) it primarily handles payments of large individual value; and (iii) 
it is used to settle financial market transactions or to settle other payment systems.  
This chapter is dedicated to introducing the approach developed by Banco de la 
República (Machado et al., 2010) for identifying and assessing systemic risk within 
Colombia’s financial market. The approach is based on an application of NT and 
simulation techniques to BR’s large-value PS (henceforth referred as CUD), which is the 
only large-value PS in the country and is used to settle all financial market transactions 
and to settle other PS, thus a systemically important SP by CPSS’s (2001) standards.  
Different from other approaches based on network topology, the chosen approach relies 
on payments as connections. Balance sheet claims between institutions as sources of 
connectedness (Chan-Lau, 2010b) are deemed by the authors as impractical for the 
purpose of this document because (i) it is not clear whether off-balance positions are 
being captured or not when using claims, whilst payments comprise all transactions 
between payments system’s participants; (ii) unlike claims, relying on payments allow for 
considering liquidity as a key factor in systemic risk; (iii) as acknowledged by Tumpel-
Gugerell (2009), a particular institution might not only be systemically relevant because 
other institutions are financially exposed to it, but also because other market participants 
rely on the continued provision of its services; and (iv) as emphasized by Kodres (2009), 
failure or insolvency are not the only sources of systemic shocks, but mere failure-to-pay 
or non-payment of transactions can gridlock the entire financial system.  
4.1  A brief introduction to Colombian large-value payments system 
The Colombian PS comprises a centralized network infrastructure in which BR’s CUD 
operates as a hub that maintains communication with all other participants (i.e. securities 
                                                            
25 The RTGS mechanism is characteristic of payments systems managed by central banks, where clearing 
and settlement are processed immediately and simultaneously in the accounts the institutions have with the 
central bank. In 2008, the World Bank surveyed 142 central banks about their PS and found that 112 of the 
large-value PS settle their operations according to the RTGS scheme and 108 of these PS (96%) are 
operated by the central bank (World Bank, 2009).  16 
 
depositaries, low-value payment systems, the Foreign Exchange Clearing House, the 
Chamber of Central Counterparty Risk), where the participant that generates most activity 
and volume is BR’s own securities depositary (DCV), which is exclusively dedicated to 
clearing and delivering the most liquid fixed-income securities in the local market: central 
government’s local public debt bonds (TES). All financial institutions –and some special 
official entities- are allowed to participate directly in the CUD, which is in charge of the 
clearing and settlement of all their payments; the most relevant types of financial 
institutions participating in CUD are briefly described in Table 1. 
The CUD started in September 1998 and, since then, it has operated as a RTGS system, 
with its monthly volume representing as much as 1.71 times the GDP (September and 
October 2009). During 2009, 160 institutions directly conducted transactions in the CUD, 
where Commercial Banks (CB) and Brokerage Firms (BF) were the most active with about 
75% of all operations.  
Table 1 
Main Colombian market’s financial institutions directly participating in CUD (2009) 






Commercial Bank (CB)  Provision of deposit and loans, including mortgages. [18] 
Commercial Financial 
Corporation (CFC) 
Provision of deposit and loans focused on goods and 
services commercialization (e.g. leasing). [26] 
Financial Corporation 
(CF) 
Provision of deposit and loans focused on medium term 




Mutual Fund (MF) 
Provision of investment vehicles with the purpose of 
investing in securities and other assets according to the 
risk profile of the investor. [26] 
Brokerage Firm (BF) 
Provision of brokerage services with the purpose of 
buying and selling securities (e.g. stocks, bonds, 
currencies); allowed to trade for its own account. [32] 
Pension Fund Manager 
(PFM) 
Provision of investment vehicles with the purpose of 
investing for retirement. [6] 
Special Official 
Institution (SOI) 
Official (government owned) financial institutions with 
special objectives; due to its main features, they were 
excluded from the analysis. 
b  [10] 
a Financial cooperatives pertain to Credit Institutions, but due to its low connectedness and size they were 
excluded from the analysis; CIs are the only institutions able to receive LLR liquidity.  
b SOI type comprise ten government owned institutions, where the largest is Fogafin, the deposit insurance 
agency. Their involvement in the CUD is rather low, thus they were excluded from the analysis.  
c  Only the main differencing feature appears; the number of institutions as of 2009 appears in brackets.  
Source: authors’ design.
 
As previously mentioned, the CUD, unlike other countries’ PS (e.g. CHAPS Sterling in the 
U.K.), is a direct participation system where any type of financial institution can maintain 
deposits and conduct transactions with other participants without the need for an agent or 
intermediary. For this reason, the CUD has a large number of direct participants (160) 
representing all types of institutions, banking and non-banking. In comparison, according 
to Becher et al. (2008b), CHAPS Sterling in the United Kingdom is characterized as 17 
 
having more than 4,000 institutions that participate indirectly through 15 members or 
direct participants,
26 who act as agents for the others to make their payments. 
When institutions participating in the PS experience temporary liquidity problems, they can 
make use of BR’s resources through different facilities. Within its expanded inflation 
targeting scheme, in which the stability of the financial system plays an essential role, 
BR’s liquidity facilities can be grouped according to their objective, namely: (i) for 
macroeconomic liquidity, through Open Market Operations (OMO); (ii) for the ordinary 
operation of the PS, through intra-day repos, which may be converted into overnight 
repos; and (iii) for financial stability, which is achieved when BR fulfills its LLR function. 
Regarding OMO, they are BR’s main monetary policy instrument, as is the case with most 
central banks that use an inflation targeting approach. OMO transactions (via selling or 
purchasing TES) are conducted by OMO agents, which by the end of May 2010 
accounted for 97 institutions, where CBs, CFCs and CFs are the most active.  
About the second facility, BR introduced two instruments to complement OMO and to 
ease PS’s liquidity pressures: the intra-day repo and the overnight repo. Intra-day repos 
first became available in January 2001 and are used by institutions to cover their liquidity 
shortages during the trading hours. The overnight repo facility has been in place since 
May 2001, and it materializes in two ways: (i) after an institution fails to fulfill an intra-day 
repo, and (ii) when a CB does not have enough funds to clear checks. 
Concerning the third facility, BR can act as a LLR to minimize contagion and to keep the 
financial system stable. As asserted by Meltzer (1986), under special conditions, this 
function allows central banks for providing the resources an institution needs to deal with 
a transitory liquidity problem. In Colombia this is known as Transitory Liquidity Facility 
(TLF), and is reserved exclusively for Credit Institutions, which are firms dedicated to the 
provision of deposit and loan products, namely CBs, CFCs and CFs.  
4.2 Network topology and payments simulation for identifying and 
assessing systemic risk 
The periods and the institutions to be evaluated and analyzed were defined in order to 
assess the systemic risk and potential threat to the stability of the PS and the financial 
markets. Three periods representative of CUD transactions were selected based on the 
concept of liquidity and TES market activity, which follows the need for effectively 
capturing different volatility and liquidity scenarios for the Colombian financial market, 
allowing for a better assessment of the dynamics of PS stability. Afterwards, based on the 
selected scenarios, the four institutions of greatest systemic importance within the CUD 
were selected.
27   
Pursuant to the foregoing, the month of June 2006 was selected as the period 
representative of high volatility in the PS, corresponding to the most recent acute stress in 
the TES market; akin to 1987’s crash, LTCM’s and the most recent global financial crisis, 
June 2006 was characterized by a run on local market liquidity, where the non-banking 
financial institutions, namely BFs and MFs, were particularly threatened. This period 
                                                            
26 According to Becher et al. (2008b), four of the 15 direct members of CHAPS Sterling conduct most of the 
transactions. 
27 Selecting the four institutions of greatest systemic importance follows practical reasons. An objective 
threshold for deciding the number of systemic relevance is not addressed in this document.   18 
 
witnessed a sharp drop in the price of TES (local market’s benchmark) and low market 
liquidity, with characteristics quite similar to those observed in August 2002.
28  
Contrasting with June 2006, four months before was a period characterized by high 
liquidity and low volatility in Colombian financial markets, where the TES market exhibited 
the peak of a prominent boom. Thus, February 2006 was chosen as a period 
representative of tranquil times, with abundant liquidity and confidence among the market 
participants.  
September 2009, the month when the CUD registered the largest trading volume since its 
creation, was selected as well.  In all, 215,776 transactions were conducted during that 
month for a volume representing 170.7% of GDP, with a daily average of 9,808 
transactions.  
The NT and payment simulation is applied to a single day of transactions. Therefore, a 
method to construct a typical day of operations in the CUD was designed once the periods 
had been selected. This process involved taking monthly samples (i.e. February and June 
2006, and September 2009) of CUD transactions to discern the principal characteristics of 
the transactions in each period. Then, an “average day” of transactions (μ) was estimated 
with the bootstrap method.
29 In order to preserve the main statistical properties of the 
sample (i.e. intraday-seasonality) the database was divided in several time-of-the-day 
buckets, and the bootstrap procedure was applied independently for each bucket until 
approximating the average volume of transactions per bucket, and the overall average 
volume of transactions per day, as depicted in Figure 3.  
Figure 3 
Estimating an “average day” of payments transactions 
 
Source: authors´ design. 
 
                                                            
28 Based on the fixed-income index (IDXTES) developed by Reveiz and León (2008), August 2002 
corresponds to a return of -2.82% (-10.5 standard deviations) and June 2006 to -2.26% (-8.4 standard 
deviations). 
 
29 A bootstrap procedure involves resampling, with replacement, from the existing data set (Dowd, 2002); in 




















Using an “average day” estimated in this way, rather than any particular single day, allows 
for a more robust characterization of the stability of the PS network in different scenarios, 
as it preserves the conditions found during the period (i.e. liquidity, intra-day seasonality), 
while mitigating the impact of infrequent but large operations on the part of certain non-
financial participants (e.g. Ministry of Finance). However, this step may be skipped and a 
single day of data may be used if deemed appropriate. 
Based on the “average day” of transactions for each period, an overall index based on (i) 
each institution’s share of the total traded value and (ii) each institution’s share of the total 
number of connections during the three scenarios was constructed
30; these two measures 
are traditional (in-degree and out-degree) measures of centrality, a concept which refers 
to the importance and location of the participant or node in the network (ECB, 2010; 
Soramäki et al., 2007). This index serves as a primary approximation to the notion of 
systemic risk based on the idea of TCTF. Table 2 shows the results of the index for the 
ten foremost connected (central) institutions. These ten institutions, which represent 6.3% 
of the CUD participants, account for 47.4% of the traded value and 25.8% of the 
connections. Among the top ten institutions of major systemic importance according to the 
centrality concept there are seven CBs, two BFs and one FC.  
Table 2 

















INST1  8,4%  100  3,5%  100  200  100 
INST2  7,1%  85  3,1%  87  139  70 
INST3  6,6%  78  2,8%  78  127  63 
INST4  4,9%  58  2,6%  72  107  53 
INST5  5,0% 60 2,5% 70  106  53 
INST6  3,7% 44 2,7% 77  101  50 
INST7  2,3% 27 2,7% 77  89  44 
INST8  3,6% 43 2,2% 63  88  44 
INST9  2,8% 33 2,0% 55  74  37 
INST10 3,1% 36 1,8% 51  72  36 
a The ten foremost connected (central) institutions represent 47.4% of the total traded value and 
25.8% of the total connections. 
Source: authors´ calculations. 
 
As indicated in Figure 4, pursuant to the notion of TCTF (left side of Figure 4), the CBs are 
the institutions of greatest systemic importance within the ten foremost connected 
                                                            
30 In this index, the institution with the largest share of total value or total connections obtains a score of 100. 
The following institutions, by linear interpolation, obtain a score between 0 and 100. The aggregate 
corresponds to the sum of the index obtained for each institution in both categories, which is then used to 
calculate a general or overall index. Participants such as the Ministry of Finance were excluded from this 
analysis; their characteristics demand a special study to assess their systemic impact.  20 
 
institutions (64.4% and 67.7% of traded value and number of connections, respectively), 
although the BFs are significant as well (28.0% and 23.6%, respectively).  
Figure 4 
Ten foremost relevant institutions: TCTF and TBTF 
3-period average 
 
Source: authors´ calculations. 
 
Pursuant to the TBTF concept, which is customarily measured according to the asset 
value and the loans outstanding
31 (right side of Figure 4), CBs are practically the only 
institutions that may be regarded as systemically relevant (91.5% and 92.8% of assets 
value and loans outstanding); the remaining share of asset value loans outstanding 
pertains to Fogafin (the deposit insurance agency) and other SOI. This stresses the 
importance of considering connectivity as a measure of systemic risk. 
Figure 5 portrays the make-up of the index of systemic importance for the top ten 
institutions in the three periods and an average of these. The average’s first seven 
institutions appear in all the selected periods. This suggests the institutions with more 
systemic risk, pursuant to the notion of centrality, are relatively stable over time.  
Figure 5 
Ten foremost relevant institutions: TCTF and TBTF 




31 Another customary measure of size is the value of deposits. It is not included because CB, CF and CFC are 
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Trading Volume Peak (September 2009)  3-period Average 
 
Source: authors´ calculations. 
 
The first four institutions of greatest systemic average importance according to the 
centrality metrics were selected to carry out targeted shocks (attacks) on the PS (i.e. 
INST1, INST2, INST3, and INST4 in Table 2). The result was a sample with two types of 
institutions: CBs and BFs. The systemic effect of an attack on each of the four selected 
institutions will be simulated in the following sections, and the results will be presented 
and analyzed as an average per type of institution.
32 
Figure 6 
Distribution of connections and payments per institution (%)  
3-period average 
Connections (in and out)  Payments (value) 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
It is worthwhile to emphasize the importance of the usage of centrality for deciding which 
institutions will be attacked in the NT and simulation approaches. As documented before, 
because the distribution of institutions’ connectivity is significantly fat-tailed and skewed 
(Figure 6), using random shocks will tend to overlook systemic risk; TCTF entities await in 
the uttermost right side of the distribution. Assessing the centrality of institutions allows for 
                                                            
32 Authors deem necessary to present results as an average per type of institution (e.g. CB and BF) in order to 
preserve confidentiality. This is also the reason not to disclose the names of the institutions or the precise 































































































































































selecting those entities that actually may endanger systemic stability, whilst preserving 
parsimony within the approach.
33  
As before (Figure 4), using centrality as an objective metric for systemic importance based 
on the TCTF concept allowed for identifying institutions which would have been 
disregarded by the traditional TBTF concept. This is evident in Figure 7, where network 
theory (graphs) is used to simultaneously present TCTF and the TBTF concepts for each 
scenario. The size of each arrow’s head represents the total value of the payments (i.e. 
connectedness), whilst the size of the node represents the asset size; please note that the 
four foremost relevant institutions under the centrality concept and their connections have 
been differentiated (in red) for illustrative purposes, where the [∈(INST1Æ4)] nodes 
corresponds to the institutions belonging to INST1, INST2, INST3 or INST4, and the 
[∉(INST1Æ4)] to those not belonging, either pertaining to the CB or BF institution types (in 
rectangles). 
Figure 7 
Colombia’s financial system as a network (graphs) 
 
Boom in the TES Market (February 2006)
 
 
Stress in the TES Market (June 2006)
 
                                                            
33 Instead of using random shocks or targeted shocks based on centrality  it is possible to shock all the 
institutions of the system. Nevertheless, this may be computationally inefficient  and burdensome, especially in 
a PS where any financial institution may participate directly; this is the case in hand, where it would be 























Trading Volume Peak (September 2009) 
 
Source: authors´ calculations. 
 
Regarding the graphs in Figure 7 it is key to emphasize the following: (i) as expected, 
focusing on the size of institutions (nodes’ size) would concentrate supervision on Credit 
Institutions (CBs, CFCs and CFs), along with government related SOIs; (ii) focusing on 
the size of the institutions would overlook the importance of the “shadow banking system”, 
with BFs being institutions heavily connected to CB for the three scenarios considered; (iii) 
the nodes corresponding to the four foremost systemic relevant institutions [∈(INST1Æ4)] 
concentrate a significant share of the connections within the network, thus supporting their 
choice for illustrative purposes.  
All this further supports the mainstay of the TCTF concept: using the size of the institution 
is insufficient to assess its contribution to systemic risk within the financial network; it is 
necessary to shift from micro-prudential to macro-prudential approaches, where the latter 
refers to the objective of promoting the stability of the financial system as a whole 
(Clement, 2010).
34          
4.2.1 The  static  approach: network topology 
Network topology (also known as network analysis or network theory) is a method used in 
statistical physics to understand and analyze the structure and functioning of complex 
networks. Recent applications demonstrate its usefulness in analyzing how PSs respond 
to liquidity stress. The studies by Soramäki et al. (2006) and Bech and Garrat (2006) use 
NT to characterize the PS in the United States (Fedwire),
35 while Ianoka et al. (2004) 
apply it to the PS in Japan (BoJ-Net).  In the Colombian case, Cepeda (2008) applies NT 
to the CUD to quantify the impact of failures on its stability.  
A PS network is made up of a set of nodes or vertexes (institutions participating in CUD) 
and connections or links (payments) between pairs of nodes. The connections between 
nodes can be directed or not, and can be weighted (by value or volume of payments) to 
reflect the strength or weight of the link that is established. Accordingly, the PS is 
                                                            
34 Central bank’s macro-prudential role makes part of its oversight function, which has the objective of 
attaining an efficient and safe payments and settlement system (CPSS, 2005).   
35 The applications of Lublóy (2006) for Hungary and Boss et al. (2004) to measure systemic risk in the 













constructed of nodes or participants, which are the institutions that comprise the network 
and conduct transactions with one another.  
Based on this characterization, it is possible to study the basic properties of the network, 




Selected NT parameters 
Average 
distance 
Refers to the lowest average number of connections or links needed to 
connect two nodes, and indicates how close the nodes are in the network. 
Diameter 
Pertains to the maximum distance between two nodes, and makes it possible 
to determine the number of connections (payment relationships) needed for 
any two nodes (participants) to interact.  
Connectivity 
Refers to the ratio between the number of connections observed in the network 
and the number of possible connections in the network.  It captures network 
density, which reflects just how interconnected the nodes are in the network.  
Source: Authors’ design, based on Cepeda (2008). 
 
Calculating the stability of the PS based on NT is intended to characterize the CUD as a 
network, so as to estimate its stability in scenarios that involve an institution’s failure-to-
pay or non-payment. Initially, the parameters described in Table 3 were calculated for the 
CUD payment network in each of the selected periods (average days for February and 
June 2006, and September 2009). The next step was to recalculate the network’s 
parameters after subjecting it to failure-to-pay by a selected node; this is a targeted shock 
or attack. This was done by eliminating the transactions originating from that institution 
(out-degree), but preserving those made by its counterparties (in-degree), including 
transactions which correspond to payments directed to the failing node. 
Four failure-to-pay or non-payment scenarios were designed for each period, with each 
corresponding to an institution that ceases –for whatever reason
37- to make its payments 
(i.e. INST1, INST2, INST3, INST4 from Table 2). These attack scenarios are interpreted 
as static in nature, since they consider all the transactions sent/received in the selected 
average day regardless of the order in which they were conducted, nor taking into account 
whether the participants had enough funds on their BR’s deposit accounts to fulfill those 
payments. Assuming that institutions had enough funds may result in some nodes or 
participants remaining “artificially” connected to the network after the attack because they 
are taken as able to comply with their payments when, in certain cases, they could have 
exhausted their liquidity.  
Afterwards, the approach consisted of evaluating the change in network’s parameters (i.e. 
connectivity, diameter, average distance), identifying the type of network (e.g. the 
distribution of number of connections per node), as well as measuring the effect caused 
by the attacked institution on the traded amount and the number of disconnected 
institutions. As asserted by Becher et al. (2008), if the network is robust and stable, the 
                                                            
36 Basic concepts of NT applied to PS’s stability analysis are used in this paper. Cepeda (2008) describes and 
uses additional concepts and metrics. 
37 It is important to emphasize that the reason behind the non-payment or failure-to-pay of the institution is 
non-specified; it may be due to liquidity problems, solvency, operational risk, legal risk, etc.  25 
 
attack should have little effect on other participants; that is, the properties of the network 
should not differ significantly compared to those in the original scenario (with no attack).  
The results of the exercise are exhibited in Table 4, in the form of variations with respect 
to the original scenario. It is evident that the impact on the network varies depending on 
the type of institution under attack and the selected period. For example, the attack on 
BFs has more of an impact on the network during the boom and stress periods, while the 
CBs had the most impact during the period of greatest activity in the PS.  
The attack on the BFs in the boom scenario (February 2006) had a larger average impact 
in terms of reducing the amount traded (8.5%) than the impact derived from the attack on 
the CBs (5.9%), which was also reflected in the decline in the number of transactions 
(7.4% and 4.7%, respectively). During that same scenario, attacks on the institutions 
caused no major changes in distance and diameter, although connectivity declined 
considerably.  
Failure-to-pay by BFs in the stress scenario (June 2006) generated less of a reduction in 
the amount traded and the number of transactions than was the case during the previous 
scenario (7.1% and 7.2%, respectively), and a lower connectivity loss.
38 It is noteworthy 
that failure-to-pay by BFs generates a marginal loss in network stability, but does cause 
one participating institution to disconnect from the network; in other words, it neither 
receives nor makes payments within the PS.  
Table 4 
Attacks’ effects on the network (CUD) – static approach (NT) 
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Network Features 



















































































































































CB  -5,9%  -4,7% 0,01  0  -2,8% -1  1  0  0 
BF  -8,5%  -7,4% 0,01  0  -4,5% -1  0  1  0 
TES Stress 
(Jun/2006) 
CB  -6,5%  -4,9% 0,03  1  -2,3% -1  0  1  0 
BF  -7,1%  -7,2% 0,01  0  -3,3% -1  1  0  1 
CUD trading 
peak (Sep/09) 
CB  -9,1%  -6,6% 0,01  0  -3,3% -2  1  1  0 
BF  -5,4%  -5,3% 0,02  0  -2,6% -1  1  0  0 
a Corresponds to the number of nodes; rounded to the next integer.  
b As defined in Table 3. 
Source: authors´ calculations. 
  
                                                            
38 As presented in Machado et al. (2010) the stress period (June 2006) exhibits the lowest level of connectivity 
among the chosen scenarios (60.6%, 46.1% and 49.7% for scenarios 1, 2 and 3, respectively), which 
intuitively results from participants’ reluctance to engage in market transactions. This explains why the 
connectivity loss during the stress period is –on average- the lowest. 26 
 
During the period of increased activity in the network (September 2009) the average 
failure-to-pay by CBs results in a decline of 9.1% in traded value within the PS and 6.6% 
in terms of the number of transactions. The distance increases by 0.01, the diameter 
remains the same, and connectivity is down by 3.3%. Contrary to the previous period, 
there were no disconnected nodes. 
The average result of the attacks during the three selected periods is shown in Table 5, by 
type of institution. CBs are the institutions with more of a direct impact on the volume 
traded, since their failure-to-pay would lower the average traded amount in the CUD by 
7.2%, as opposed to a decrease of 7.0% by BFs. Nevertheless, the SBFs have more of a 
direct impact in terms of the average number of transactions, which are down 6.6% 
compared to the reduction of 5.4% generated by the attack on the CBs. As for network 
connectivity, the attack on the BFs results in an average decline of 3.5%, which is more 
than the reduction caused by the attack on the CBs (2.8%).  
Network topology confirms that the TBTF concept is insufficient to identify systemic risk 
sources. For Colombian large-value payments system (i.e. CUD), focusing on the size of 
the institutions would result in overlooking the importance of BF, which appear to be of 
similar systemic relevance as CBs.  
Table 5 
Attacks’ effects on the network (CUD) – static approach (NT) 




Network Topology Criteria 
Network Features 



















































































































































-7,2%  -5,4% 0,02  0  -2,8% -1  1  0  0 
-7,0%  -6,6% 0,01  0  -3,5% -1  0  0  0 
a Corresponds to the number of nodes; rounded to the next integer.  
b As defined in Table 3. 
Source: authors´ calculations. 
 
4.2.2  The dynamic approach: payments simulation 
NT can be used to characterize and analyze the structure and operation of complex 
networks. However, in its basic form, this approach can have certain limitations. As 
presented so far, the attack involved removing a node or participant as the originator of 
transactions under two key assumptions: (i) other institutions are always able to fulfill their 
obligations (i.e. their intra-day liquidity level is not considered) and (ii) other institutions do 
not react to the attack. 27 
 
Relaxing the first assumption involves acknowledging that the capacity of institutions to 
conduct their transactions depends on their opening balance in the CUD at the start of the 
day, as well as all the transactions that imply an inflow and outflow of resources for them 
during the day, where the opportunity of each transaction is related to the ability of each 
institution to fulfill its obligations. On the other hand, relaxing the second assumption 
would demand making additional and challenging assumptions about how information 
spreads throughout the financial markets and about the manner non-attacked institutions 
react upon the arrival of this information; this is the reason why this assumption was 
preserved.
39   
Simulation exercises may provide the central bank with additional information that is 
valuable for managing liquidity in the PS. In this respect, Leinonen and Soramäki (2004) 
suggest that simulation analysis of PS transactions makes it possible, among other things, 
(i) to quantify the result of a change in payment flows; (ii) to determine the result in 
payment queues and liquidity requirements owing to the change in payment flows; and (iii) 
to quantify the need for overnight liquidity or the value and number of transactions that 
would not be completed if additional liquidity is not available.  
Therefore, simulation of a complex system provides access to information that is not 
available through traditional statistical or econometric approaches, neither to NT. For 
these reasons, the NT approach is supplemented with a simulation model of CUD’s 
payments in order to develop a dynamic analysis that measures the direct and indirect 
impact of the attack.  
This approach, which compares end-of-the-day liquidity in a base scenario (i.e. with no 
attack) to end-of-the-day liquidity in a scenario where there was an attack on an 
institution, captures the direct and indirect effects of the failure-to-pay, the latter being 
caused by having connections with a previously affected institution; this is, this approach 
captures the attack’s extended (i.e. second-hand) effects, which are the mainstay of 
systemic risk. Afterwards, based on NT, the simulation of payments’ results are used to 
compare the network’s properties (e.g. connectivity, diameter, average distance) before 
and after the attack. Finally, the responsiveness and resilience of participating institutions 
was analyzed according to their financial structure and access to BR’s liquidity in the 
event of attacks on the PS.  
The simulation of payments uses the opening balances and CUD transactions for each of 
the three selected periods as the base scenario, where central bank’s liquidity facilities is 
excluded from CUD’s transactions.
40 The base scenarios are compared to the attack 
scenarios, in which failure to fulfill any payment by one of the four institutions selected 
                                                            
39 Relaxing this second assumption requires a more extensive study to identify information conditions in the 
market (e.g. the existence of asymmetries, intra-group information management, and the response strategy by 
type of institution or particular entity), which is beyond the scope of this work; this assumption is common 
when using simulation techniques (Leinonen and Soramäki, 2004), but has been addressed by Soramäki et al. 
(2007). Authors consider this assumption as a rather interesting starting point for two reasons. First, it may be 
regarded as a stringent case in which a system’s hub will act as a liquidity drain, where a major participant 
receives all their counterparties’ payments but makes no payments to its counterparties. Second, because 
each source of systemic shock entails different informational dissemination and reaction dynamics (e.g. an 
operational driven failure may become noticeable later than a solvency issue), maintaining the non-reaction 
assumption serves the purpose of not specifying the source of shock. Nevertheless, authors acknowledge that 
the failure of a hub becoming public could have major consequences for the institutions’ willingness to make 
payments to each other or even bank runs, which may generate an extreme disruption case.   
40 Excluding central bank’s liquidity facilities from the central bank is convenient because it allows for obtaining 
true end-of-the-day liquidity requirements by the participating institutions, thus allowing for assessing the total 
liquidity required by the system and each participating institution. This will also allow for properly evaluating 
the sufficiency of central bank’s liquidity facilities.  28 
 
according to their degree of connectivity is assumed to occur from 9:00a.m onwards. The 
parameter for comparison will be the variation between the base scenario and the attack 
scenario with respect to the unresolved payments each institution still has on queue 
(Payments on Queue, PoQ) at the end of the day.   
Figure 8 reproduces the dynamics of the simulation procedure. The simulation is based on 
the liquidity institutions have in their deposit accounts (opening balance), which is affected 
during the day by the transactions registered chronologically in the CUD. Because the 
objective is to replicate a RTGS large-value PS (i.e. CUD), a transaction can be carried 
out only if the institution making the payment has enough funds in its deposit account. If it 
does not, the payment is placed on the queue of outstanding payments (PoQ). PoQ will 
be fulfilled to the extent the institution obtains enough funds to cover all or part of them, for 
which a Queue Resolution Algorithm (QRA) was defined. 
Figure 8 
Simulation of payments process 
 
Source: authors’ design. 
 
The selected QRA is based on the “First In First Out” or FIFO algorithm, which is the one 
most commonly used.
41 Every time a transaction is executed (i.e. a payment is made), the 
algorithm assesses if the institution that received funds has any PoQ and whether or not 
the new balance is sufficient to cover any of these left-pending transactions. The algorithm 
respects the order in which the unfulfilled transactions were placed on queue. If it is 
possible to settle one of the outstanding payments, it is registered as a new transaction. 
This, in turn, prompts the QRA to search again to determine if the institution that received 
funds has any PoQ, if the new balance is sufficient to settle any of the outstanding 
payments, and so forth.
42 This type of QRA is known as FIFO-bypass (BR, 2009). 
                                                            
41 Leinonen and Soramäki (2004) document the existence of other types of algorithms, including those that 
give priority to smaller transactions and others that allow the originator of the transaction to assign a 
preference to each transaction; the latter is the case of the CUD in Colombia and CHAPS in the United 
Kingdom. The FIFO system was used because of its simplicity and given the difficulty of determining the 
priority assigned by each participant when registering transactions in the CUD. 
42 Jurgilas and Martin (2010) describe recent developments for managing liquidity in RTGS payment systems 































































To manage the liquidity in the system more efficiently a multilateral clearing and 
settlement algorithm was used to net institutions’ PoQ at different points in time. For this 
purpose five multilateral nettings were carried out during the trading day, all made during 
periods of peak intra-day trading. Liquidity savings are generated this way, giving 
participating institutions more capacity for settling PoQ and allowing for more efficient use 
of liquidity in the simulation.
43   
Based on the payments registered and settled using the simulation approach, the NT is 
applied to the simulated CUD’s settled transactions with and without attack, and a new 
characterization of the network is provided. Table 6 shows a comparison of the results 
obtained with both approaches, where using NT on the simulations’ results allows for 
assessing the direct and indirect (extended) impact of the attack on PS liquidity, where the 
intraday liquidity level is properly captured. As expected, the decline in network activity is 
more pronounced after using the simulation procedure, both in terms of volume traded 
and the number of transactions. This is an intuitive result since the simulation approach, 
unlike the basic NT approach, considers the direct and indirect effects of the attack and 
the intraday liquidity.  
Table 6 
Attacks’ effects on the network (CUD) – static approach (NT) and  
dynamic approach (simulation + NT) 
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Network Features 


















































































































































CB  -7,2%  -5,4%  0,017  0  -2,8% -1  1  0  0 
BF  -7,0%  -6,6%  0,015  0  -3,5% -1  0  0  0 
Dynamic 
(simul. + NT) 
CB  -11,0%  -11,7% 0,019  0  -3,6% -1  1  0  0 
BF  -12,8%  -16,8% 0,024  0  -5,0% -1  0  0  0 
a Corresponds to the number of nodes; rounded to the next integer.  
b As defined in Table 3. 
Source: authors´ calculations. 
 
With the standard NT model CB’s failure-to-pay yielded, on average, a decline of 7.2% 
and 5.4% in the value and number of transactions in the network, in that order. With NT 
applied to simulations’ results, these attacks led to declines of 11% and 11.7% in value 
and number of transactions, respectively. Likewise, in the case of BFs results yielded a 
greater reduction in value (from 7% to 12.8%) and number of transactions (from 6.6% to 
16.8%). As for the characteristics of the nodes, the attack on selected institutions with the 
                                                            
43 Multilateral clearing and settlement is done pursuant to the approach used in the DCV with transactions 
from SEN. In the simulation procedure it is done at 12:00, 14:00, 15:00, 16:00 and 18:00 hours. 30 
 
dynamic model led to a sizeable reduction in activity, as well as longer distances and less 
connectivity; this is more evident in the BFs case.  
4.2.3  Results: assessing systemic risk and central bank’s challenges  
PS activity in the event of failure-to-pay by one or more institutions can be captured 
through the variation in the end-of-the-day PoQ of each institution that conducted 
transactions during the day. By means of this analysis it is possible to: (i) identify the 
institutions that significantly affect the stability of the network when attacked; (ii) identify 
the institutions that are affected directly and indirectly as a result of the attack; (iii) quantify 
the  impact of an attack on individual and systemic liquidity; (iv) analyze institutions’ 
resilience, which corresponds to their capacity to deal with systemic risk by making use of 
their own liquid portfolios (TES), as well as BR’s liquidity facilities. The results are 
distinguished by class and type of institution, namely (i) CIs (CB, CFC, CF) and (ii) NCIs 
(BF, MF, PFM), which correspond to the banking and non-banking institutions, also 
referred as banking and shadow-banking sectors, respectively.   
Accordingly, the variation of each institution’s PoQ by the end of the day allows for  
quantifying the liquidity shortage an institution would face, and if it has the means 
to absorb such shortage by using its own account TES portfolio and/or BR’s 
liquidity facilities. With this approach, an increase in an institution’s PoQ means it 
has been affected, inasmuch as the opening balance and the payments received 
from third parties were insufficient to fully meet its payment obligations, due to the 
failure-to-pay by the selected institution or failure-to-pay by other institutions that 
were affected by the failure-to-pay of the former.  
No change in an institution’s PoQ after the attack would mean (i) it did not cease to 
receive payments as a direct or indirect result of the attack or (ii) in spite of not receiving 
all the payments as a direct or indirect result of the attack, it had an opening balance in 
the CUD or a payment structure that allowed it to retain the same level of PoQ. In both 
cases, for the purpose of analysis, the institution is considered as non-affected.  
To assess institutions’ resilience, which corresponds to the magnitude of the impact on 
their liquidity, three ratios were designed to show the increase in PoQ as a percentage of 
the following variables: (i) the market value of the TES portfolio, which is the most liquid 
and easy-to-collateralize security in the market; (ii) the liquidity limit in OMO for each 
institution, and (iii) the liquidity limit in TLF for each CI.  
In the case of the first indicator, the variation in PoQ with respect to the market value of 
the TES portfolio comes close to the concept of potential liquidity, as it would indicate 
whether the sale of the TES portfolio or its use as collateral would be enough to cover the 
outstanding payments in the CUD. A discount factor on the market value of the portfolio of 
each institution was used in order to capture the effect of instability on the market and its 31 
 
corresponding effect on securities’ prices
44. Such discount factor pertains to the maximum 
haircut rate used by BR (currently 3%)
45 and results in the TES Portfolio* variable.  
The second ratio consists of the maximum liquidity an institution can obtain through 
transitory expansion operations with BR, including OMO and intra-day and overnight 
repos.
46 The third indicator refers to the resources CIs may access through TLF, which 
are the resources provided by BR on behalf of its LLR function.
47 The last two indicators 
make it possible to assess whether or not the current limits set for OMOs and TLF are 
sufficient for BR to meet liquidity needs in adverse systemic scenarios. All three ratios 
allow for assessing the resilience of the institutions to the attacks. 
4.2.3.1  Scenario 1: Boom in the TES Market (February 2006) 
The results, on average, demonstrates that failure-to-pay by one of the four institutions 
(INST1, INST2, INST3, INST4) in this scenario affects 41.3% of the CUD participants; this 
is, 41.3% of the participating institutions observe an increase in their PoQ. The results for 
the boom scenario with respect to each of the four selected institutions are presented in 
Figure 9, which relates the variation in PoQ to the market value of the TES portfolio 
(horizontal axis), and the variation in PoQ to the limit for accessing BR’s OMO transitory 
liquidity (vertical axis); please note that both axis are truncated to 200% for practical 
purposes. 
In this sense, the situation of the institutions in the upper right quadrant is more critical 
with respect to the two variables under analysis, as they would be unable to meet their 
liquidity needs with their TES portfolio or with OMO resources; those institutions will be 
referred as impacted by the failure-to-pay of the attacked institution. Meanwhile, 
institutions located in the shaded portion would be resilient; that is, they are able to cover 
the increase in their PoQ after the attacks –either by selling or collateralizing their TES 
portfolio or by using its OMO quota-, thus they will be regarded as non-impacted.   
MFs and BFs were the institutions most affected in this scenario. INST1 was the institution 
that, on average, generated the most instability in the PS, having led to an increase of the 
PoQ for 48.5% of the participating institutions. Attacks on INST2, INST3 and INST4 
affected 38%, 32% and 32% of the institutions, respectively. 
 
                                                            
44 It is worthwhile stating that during periods of financial turmoil (e.g. 2002 and 2006) the flight to quality in the 
Colombian market consists of shifting from TES or stocks to dollars; therefore, despite being issued by the 
central government and being considered as local credit risk-free instruments, TES’ prices tend to fall during 
local crisis.  
45 This is, each institution may use (1-α) of the market value of its TES portfolio, where α is the maximum 
percentage of the haircut used by BR. This provides an approximate scenario to what a market stress episode 
may be and, in turn, yields more conservative results. The use of the 3% figure is fairly adequate since the 
worst daily fall ever in the IDXTES index (Reveiz and León, 2008) corresponds to 2.78% (August 22
nd 2002).   
46 This limit is 35% of the liabilities subject to reserve requirements in the case of CIs, whereas for the MFs it is 
the value of their capital plus the legal reserve. In the case of PFMs and BFs, it is their technical capital. This 
document assumes that the limit allows all institutions access to the maximum amount of liquidity permitted. 
However, in reality, there are limits to the concentration of the auction per institution, among other constraints.   
47 The limit for TLF is 15% of the highest registered level of liabilities to the public within the 15 calendar days 
prior to the date the support was granted. As stipulated in the 1991 Constitution (Article 272), TLF may be 
used only by CIs (CB, FC and CFC); this constrain obeys the fact that CIs, due to their intermediation function 





Attacks’ impact on the institutions (Scenario 1) 
INST1 INST2 
INST3 INST4 
Note: Results truncated to 200% for practical purposes.   
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
Notwithstanding the majority of CBs and FCs witnessed an increase in their PoQ, a look 
at the impact of the attacks according to the type of institution shows that they had 
sufficient liquidity because of their substantial TES portfolio, as well as their broad access 
to BR’s OMO mechanism; thus, CBs and FCs are examples of resilient types of 
institutions. Both PRMs and MFs exhibited weaknesses with respect to the use of their 
TES portfolio, while BFs experienced restrictions in terms of the limit on access to OMO. 
PFMs and MFs reduced capacity to tackle liquidity slumps is partly due to considering 
their TES own-account portfolio only, which corresponds to the existing regulation about 
restricting the use of third parties’ portfolio for accessing liquidity from BR.
48  
4.2.3.2  Scenario 2: Stress in the TES Market (June 2006) 
This scenario is characterized by considerable risk aversion among market participants. 
Unlike Scenario 1, where the TES market was booming, this scenario features a sharp 
decline in the mark-to-market value of local fixed income securities, which began in March 
2006.  
For that reason, the February 2006 and June 2006 scenarios reflect different 
environments in the local capital market, where TES market dropped by almost 10% in 
                                                            
48 The portfolios of third parties may not be used as collateral to settle an institution’s payments. This is due to 
regulations on separate accounting, conflict of interest and intention of the transaction between the institution 
and its funds.  The only possibility of using them as collateral for an obligation is limited to 30% of the assets in 
the mutual fund and only to resolve liquidity problems specific to the portfolio in question, such as requests for 












































































































































four months. This shift from a boom to a bust environment was accompanied by reduced 
activity in the PS. The number of transactions within the CUD fell from 9,400 to 7,377 
transactions (-21.5%), whereas the traded value decreased 36.5%. Also, with respect to 
the characteristics of the PS in both these scenarios, the distance between nodes 
increased, while connectivity declined. This suggests that the system became less 
robust.
49 
According to the results of the simulations, there were fewer institutions affected in the 
stress scenario (Figure 10), demonstrating the added weight exerted by factors other than 
the basic properties of the network. The attack on the selected institutions affected –on 
average- 33.9% of the participating institutions, compared to 41.3% in the boom scenario. 
Figure 10 
Attacks’ impact on the institutions (Scenario 2) 
INST1 INST2 
INST3 INST4 
Note: Results truncated to 200% for practical purposes.   
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
INST1 and INST2 were the institutions that affected the system the most, causing 47.5% 
and 31.3% of the CUD participating institutions to experience an increase in PoQ, 
respectively, whereas INST3 and INST4 affected nearly 30.3% and 25.2% of the 
participants, in that order. As for the general level of impact, despite it may seem odd to 
find that the consequences of an attack during stressful times are less important, 
participants’ higher risk aversion and reluctance to engage in counterparty and market risk 




49 The authors found that this kind of changes in the network’s properties also occurred during the transition 










































































































































4.2.3.3   Scenario 3: Trading Volume Peak in the PS (September 2009) 
September 2009, the third scenario, is characteristic of a time when the volume traded in 
the CUD reached an all-time high. During this period the network continued to show an 
increase in distance, but with higher connectivity. The new properties of the network, 
along with the premise that failure-to-pay by a systemically important institution tends to 
be magnified during periods of high PS activity, should have exhibited a SP that is more 
vulnerable than in the two previously analyzed scenarios.  
Nevertheless, the results of the simulation show that failure-to-pay by the selected 
institutions in this period affected only –on average- 22.6% of the institutions participating 
in the CUD. This is significantly lower than the 41.3% and 33.9% found in the TES market 
boom and stress scenarios, respectively (Figure 11).  
Figure 11 
Attacks’ impact on the institutions (Scenario 3) 
INST1 INST2 
INST3 INST4 
Note: Results truncated to 200% for practical purposes.   
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
This outcome is explained by a larger opening balance for CUD participants. In the boom 
and stress scenarios the average beginning-of-the-day funds in the CUD accounts 
corresponded to 36.4% and 24.2% of the September 2009’s average.
50 In the peak 
trading volume scenario the additional opening balance provided the institutions and the 
PS with enhanced protection against the failure-to-pay of any institution, which resulted in 
fewer institutions being affected and more resilience of those being affected. It is 
                                                            
50 Such a difference in the September 2009’s opening liquidity is due to CIs maintaining larger deposits in the 
CUD during this period, which went from 5.95% of liabilities subject to reserve in February 2006 to 5.66% in 
June 2006 and 8.24% in September 2009. CIs are allowed to use their reserve requirements to meet their 
intra-day liquidity needs provided that their average effective reserve at the end of the bi-weekly period never 












































































































































worthwhile to stress that customary econometric models or NT alone would have 
disregarded this relevant feature of the system, which supports the choice of simulation 
models for capturing non-linearity and context-dependency.  
4.2.3.4  Overall systemic risk assessment   
Conveniently combining NT with the simulation approach makes it possible to identify and 
measure the importance of certain variables commonly overlooked by customary use of 
econometric models and NT. Such variables can mitigate or augment the systemic effect 
of an attack on TCTF institutions, and alter institutions’ resilience and the capacity of the 
financial authorities to contain systemic risk.  
Network stability depends not only on the basic properties of the network (distance, 
diameter and connectivity), usually calculated through NT alone. It is also contingent on (i) 
network activity (e.g. number of participants and transactions, number and volume of 
payments); (ii) distribution of number of connections per node; (iii) initial conditions (e.g. 
institutions’ opening balances in the CUD); (iv) the specialty of each business (e.g. 
managing third parties’ portfolios); (v) the financial strategies used by participating 
institutions (e.g. the size of their portfolio of liquid securities); (vi) the regulation in place 
(e.g. being eligible for LLR liquidity or not); and (vii) the participants’ behavior resulting 
from the arrival of adverse information (e.g. knowledge of a systemic event).   
The results illustrate that external factors can overshadow the influence exerted by the 
network’s intrinsic properties. Accordingly, the limited degree of network activity in the 
TES stress scenario proved to be a decisive variable in mitigating the impact of failure-to-
pay by a systemic relevant institution, while the opening balance in the CUD during the 
peak trading scenario was the variable that did much to offset the increase in PoQ 
generated by the attacks and to make institutions more resilient.  
This situation is evident in Table 6, which includes the results of the failures-to-pay for 
each selected scenario. There was more of an impact on the PS in the boom scenario 
(February 2006), when 41.3% of the CUD participants were affected, compared to 33.9% 
and 22.6% in the stress and peak volume scenarios, respectively. Such outcome may be 
explained by high counterparty exposure resulting from a boom period, along with low 
levels of opening balances in the CUD and the assumption of non-reaction from other 
participants. 
In all the periods, BFs and MFs are the institutions affected the most by the attacks to 
central (TCTF) institutions. These were also the types of institutions where the variation in 
PoQ most often exceeded the TES portfolio and the OMO limit (i.e. they were the most 
impacted); this is, BFs and MFs are the less resilient institutions. BFs’ resilience is 
hampered by the existing OMO limit, whilst MFs is hindered by the level of their TES 
portfolio. This is due mostly to the specific nature of their business, since BFs manage 
large own-account portfolios, whilst MF’s portfolios are mainly third parties’. Therefore, 
when examining the behavior of the network in the different scenarios, it’s evident that 
although contagion depends on factors external to the properties of the network, there are 
other explanatory factors such as the specific nature of the business of participating 
institutions and their regulations.  
A look at the outcome of the attacks during the three selected periods, according to the 
type of institution (Table 7), shows the attack on the systemically important BFs affected –36 
 
on average- 34.3% of the institutions, whilst the attack on the CBs affected 30.2%. It’s 
important to emphasize that the TBTF concept would have missed this result, since the 
total assets (total investments) of the largest BF is about 16% (63%) of the CBs’ average; 
this is also true for NT or simulation techniques based on balance sheet claims, since the 
balance sheet exposure of other institutions to BFs is non-large and collateralized.      
CFs were the institutions most affected (i.e. share of CFs which experimented an increase 
in their PoQ), followed by the BFs and the PFMs. As in the analysis by periods, the BFs 
and the MFs are the institutions whose liquidity is affected the most. The attack on the 
systemically relevant BFs resulted in a situation where non-systemically relevant BFs 
exhibited, on average, a variation in PoQ higher than their TES portfolio and than their 
OMO limit. The situation with the CFCs and PFMs was similar.   
Attacks on CBs had a similar impact on the MFs and PFMs. It is to note that the PFMs are 
less active in the CUD, and do not routinely resort to transitory expansion operations for 
liquidity, given the volume and liquidity of the resources they manage and the –long and 
immovable- maturity of the portfolios they manage. A significant share of the institutions 
that experienced more of an increase in their PoQ were found to be resilient; this is, they 
have alternatives for solving the liquidity strains generated by the attacks, be it through the 




Attacks’ impact on the institutions – per scenario (vertical), per type of institution (horizontal) 
a 
Scenario  Criteria 
Credit Institutions (CI)  Non-Credit Institutions (NCI)  
Aggregate  
CB  CFC  CF  PFM  MF  BF 
TES Boom    
(Feb 2006) 
Affected institutions (mean)  55,9% 3,9% 62,5% 62,5% 46,0% 46,8% 41,3%  ‡ 
∆PoQ / TES Portfolio* 
Mean  7,5% 67,8% 11,1% 5410,8% 516,6% 141,6% 512,0%  ‡ 
Max.  48,4% 258,7% 21,8% 26605,7% 9752,3% 1497,5% 26605,7%  § 
∆PoQ / OMO limit 
Mean  10,0% 1,3% 15,8% 24,9% 137,4% 230,7% 109,7%  ‡ 
Max.  165,0% 2,9% 28,9% 78,7% 1734,9% 4186,7% 4186,7%  § 
∆PoQ / TLF limit 
Mean  19,2% 102,1% 37,2%
N/A 
b 
61,6%  ‡ 
Max.  103,5% 399,3% 69,8% 399,3%  § 
TES Stress   
(June 2006)
Affected institutions (mean)  56,3% 2,5% 66,7% 25,0% 35,9% 40,6% 33,9%  ‡ 
∆PoQ / TES Portfolio* 
Mean  3,5% 200,5% 2,5% 203,1% 727,9% 2652,0% 1079,8%  ‡ 
Max.  21,5% 1579,2% 5,7% 396,3% 15916,4% 191641,1% 191641,1%  § 
∆PoQ / OMO limit 
Mean  4,9% 4,3% 2,8% 35,0% 92,9% 240,5% 103,1%  ‡ 
Max.  37,5% 17,1% 5,7% 35,0% 978,6% 3321,4% 3321,4%  § 
∆PoQ / TLF limit 
Mean  12,7% 26,9% 12,5%
N/A 
b 
20,2%  ‡ 






Affected institutions (mean)  25,0% 2,3% 33,3% 50,0% 22,9% 22,9% 20,7%  ‡ 
∆PoQ / TES Portfolio* 
Mean  7,6% 6,0% 18,1% 118,8% 365652,2% 16,9% 85215,7%  ‡ 
Max.  26,4% 13,0% 24,0% 272,5% 4384820,5% 69,3% 4384820,5%  § 
∆PoQ / OMO limit 
Mean  10,6% 2,3% 47,9% 8,4% 31,1% 85,7% 37,9%  ‡ 
Max.  52,4% 4,9% 63,7% 26,1% 330,2% 286,4% 330,2%  § 
∆PoQ / TLF limit 
Mean  27,0% 5,3% 108,6%
N/A 
b 
21,4%  ‡ 
Max.  139,2% 11,6% 144,3% 144,3%  § 
a Institutions with TES portfolio or OMO limit equal to zero were discarded. Aggregate corresponds to the arithmetic sum of each type of institution (¤); to the number of 
institutions weighted average (‡); and to the maximum of all types of institutions (§). TES Portfolio* corresponds to the (1-α) market value of the TES Portfolio, where α is the 
BR's haircut. 












Credit Institutions (CI)  Non-Credit Institutions (NCI) 
Aggregate 








Affected institutions (mean)  45,8% 13,4% 58,3%  55,6% 36,1% 31,8% 30,2% † 
∆PoQ / TES Portfolio*  Mean  6,2% 5,5% 10,4%  1259,0% 190,3% 62,4% 142,1% ‡ 
Max.  22,4% 12,0% 20,4%  6836,3% 2122,1% 623,1% 8239,9% § 
∆PoQ / OMO limit  Mean  8,5% 2,0% 22,8%  13,4% 77,5% 134,6% 64,1% ‡ 
Max.  57,2% 4,6% 54,2%  24,4% 547,9% 770,0% 770,0% § 












Affected institutions (mean)  47,9% 2,5% 54,2%  48,6% 43,8% 49,0% 34,3% † 
∆PoQ / TES Portfolio*  Mean  6,2% 177,4% 9,6%  2002,5% 244407,5% 2704,3% 59089,1% ‡ 
Max.  33,1% 918,9% 17,6%  19941,1% 2197286,4% 96016,7% 2288230,8% § 
∆PoQ / OMO limit  Mean  8,5% 3,0% 16,2%  26,2% 96,7% 308,4% 124,5% ‡ 
Max.  100,1% 8,6% 32,2%  68,0% 1356,8% 2478,3% 2582,7% § 




Max.  98,4% 289,4% 75,0%  289,4% § 
a Institutions with TES portfolio or OMO limit equal to zero were discarded. Aggregate corresponds to the arithmetic sum of each type of institution (¤); to the 
number of institutions weighted average (‡); and to the maximum of all types of institutions (§). TES Portfolio* corresponds to the (1-α) market value of the TES 
Portfolio, where α is the BR's haircut. 





5 Concluding  remarks 
Systemic risk is a negative externality. Financial market’s participants have clear 
incentives to manage their own risk (e.g. credit, market, legal, operational, etc.), but no 
incentives exist for them to account the effects of their actions on other institutions or the 
system as a whole; this is, each individual institution is clearly motivated to prevent its own 
collapse but not necessarily the collapse of the system as a whole (Trichet, 2009). As a 
social consequence of individual behavior, systemic risk has to be addressed within a 
comprehensive approach, capable of capturing institutions’ contribution to systemic risk. 
The most recent episode of market turmoil exposed the limitations resulting from using 
micro-prudential approaches (e.g. TBTF) to identifying and assessing institutions’ 
contribution to systemic risk when applied to payments and financial systems, which are 
characterized by high levels of complexity, cross-dependency, context-dependency and 
non-linearity. Such limitations are not new, but have been increasingly important overtime 
due to the escalating homogeneity and opaqueness of financial markets, which has 
resulted in what the authors consider as an increasingly systemic-crisis-prone financial 
system.  
It is rather clear that a qualitative leap towards a more broad and comprehensive analysis 
of financial markets and payments systems is the first step to effectively identifying and 
assessing systemic risk. Accordingly, this document proposes an approach consisting of 
applying a convenient mixture of NT and simulation techniques, where the former allowed 
for identifying those institutions that can be regarded as central for the system, and the 
latter allowed for assessing and analyzing the resilience of not-attacked institutions and of 
the system as a whole. Afterwards, based on quantitative assessment of individual 
liquidity requirements, central bank’s means for containing systemic risk via its liquidity 
facilities are appraised and analyzed.  
Results of this approach when applied to the Colombian large-value payments system 
(CUD) yield three main remarks. First, results confirm that customary micro-prudential 
approaches (i.e. institution centric) are insufficient for identifying and assessing sources of 
systemic risk. Second, results draw attention to an ongoing debate on the improvement of 
the financial systems’ resilience through an adequate liquidity provision framework. Third, 
because this is a preliminary approach, some challenges for further research are still 
pending. This remarks will be discussed next. 
5.1  The importance of macro-prudential approaches 
Results converge to recent literature on systemic risk: although the size of the institution 
influences the systemic importance of the participating institutions (i.e. CBs), market 
activity and connectedness within the network play a key role in defining systemic 
relevance (i.e. BFs). This is, the connections between financial institutions are as 
important as the institutions themselves.   
Results also confirmed the importance of developing macro-prudential approaches. Unlike 
traditional micro-prudential approaches (e.g. TBTF), the Colombian case displayed that 
BFs are systemic risk sources as important as CBs. Despite the role of BFs was 40 
 
previously believed as systemically important within Colombia’s financial system, this 
document provides an innovative approach that allows for quantitatively assessing 
systemic importance at a disaggregate level (by institution). Furthermore, this results 
highlight the importance of the “shadow banking system”, where too-connected 
institutions, regardless of their size or the value of their claims held by other participants, 
may endanger the safety of the payments system and financial stability.  
It is important to recognize that reaching a true macro-prudential approach to systemic 
risk requires a coordinated supervision and regulation of the financial system. Financial 
authorities should work together in order to establish a comprehensive regulatory 
framework that aims to the efficient and safe functioning of the financial system, whereas 
supervision should be capable of effectively tracking individual and collective behavior for 
preserving such framework, where assessment and enforcement tools are key for this 
task. Such coordination may require designing clear institutional arrangements. 
The approach also allowed for an inclusive characterization of payments systems. Their 
stability depends not only on the basic properties of the network (distance, diameter and 
connectivity). It is also contingent on (i) network activity (e.g. number of participants and 
transactions, number and volume of payments); (ii) distribution of number of connections 
per node; (iii) initial conditions (e.g. institutions’ opening balances in the CUD); (iv) the 
specialty of each business (e.g. managing third party’s portfolios); (v) the financial 
strategies used by participating institutions (e.g. the size of their portfolio of liquid 
securities); (vi) the regulation in place (e.g. being eligible for LLR liquidity or not); and (vii) 
the participants’ behavior resulting from the arrival of adverse information (e.g. knowledge 
of a systemic event).  
5.2 Improving  financial  systems’ resilience is essential 
Results show there are institutions (i.e. BFs and MFs) that need to make more of an effort 
in terms of liquidity risk management in order to be resilient to systemic shocks and to 
contribute to the proper dispersion of risk within the system. Likewise, according to the 
results, financial authorities need to consider the convenience of designing additional 
instruments capable of providing liquidity during systemic disruptions (or modifying those 
already in place) in order to improve institution’s and market’s resilience.  
This paper’s results and the emphasized importance of improving the resilience of the 
financial system concur with recent IMF’s (2010b) request for addressing systemic 
liquidity risk. Some particular statements which are shared by the IMF (2010b) and the 
authors may outline the road to enhancing systemic risk management; they can be 
conveniently summarized as follows: 
•  Increasingly important non-banking institutions (i.e. the “shadow banking system”) 
lack of sufficient tools for systemic risk management. The role of non-banking 
institutions in funding markets and in systemic liquidity should be adequately 
understood, and those institutions’ coverage by the financial safety net should be 
properly addressed.  
•  The system has changed from bank-based to market-based systemic events, 
where the emphasis shifts from funding liquidity to market liquidity. Therefore, the 
scope of central bank’s liquidity counterparties should be broad in order to reach 
banking and non-banking systemically important participants and support 
systemic liquidity when needed.  41 
 
•  Traditional tools for liquidity risk management address individual or idiosyncratic 
risk only. It is crucial to redesign liquidity risk management tools in order to 
capture the effect of market and funding liquidity during periods of turmoil; this is, 
liquidity risk management should aim to making the institution and the system 
resilient to systemic shocks. 
•  An appropriate level of reserves serves as a liquidity buffer, and could make the 
financial system more resilient; they are the first line of defense against systemic 
shocks. Therefore, the level of required reserves should take into account the 
implications for financial stability. 
•  It is advisable to build the right incentives for institutions to manage their 
contribution to systemic risk and mitigate moral hazard; this is, it is necessary that 
institutions internalize the negative effects emerging from their financial activities.  
5.3  Further research is required 
Because this approach consists of a rather novel application of existing techniques (i.e. 
NT and simulation) and a convenient set of ratios to be analyzed, some issues are worth 
further examining. Regarding the assumptions herein used, which are the main sources of 
model risk, it is important to capture the institutions’ reactions in a more realistic manner, 
where the arrival of a failure-to-pay event by a central participant should prompt risk 
averse behavior by other participants. This is by no means an uncomplicated task since 
the source of the failure-to-pay (e.g. solvency, liquidity, operational, legal) will influence 
the way the news spread within the system, along with the type and the pace of reactions.       
Other source of model risk is focusing on the CUD. Despite being the only large-value 
payments system in the country, most of the payments result from currencies and 
securities transactions taking place in other settlement and clearing systems. In order to 
address this additional source of complexity, the NT and simulation should not only focus 
on payments but also on the settlement and clearing of securities. This will increase the 
intricacy of the model, but will display a closer look to the reality of the financial system.       
Additionally, taking into account the differences between direct participation in the 
payments system (as in CUD) and indirect participation (as the CHAPS Sterling in the 
U.K.), analyzing the different properties of each scheme in terms of stability and resilience 
is worthwhile. This paper’s results agree with Manning et al. (2009) regarding the 
convenience of direct settlement in central-bank money and of broadly establishing 
reserve accounts and access to central bank’s standing facilities, but this result is still 
preliminary and should be further addressed. 
Finally, assessing each institution’s contribution to systemic risk should serve the purpose 
of creating the right incentives for institutions caring about the risk they pose to the 
financial system. Several proposals have surged, including TCTF capital charges (Chan-
Lau, 2010) and systemic liquidity risk insurance (IMF, 2010b), which should be further 
explored as they could induce institutions to internalize the costs associated with their 
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